Abstract. Security controllers follow the execution of the target systems to prevent security violations. In fact, by proactively observing the target, they are able to catch security violations before they occur and act consequently, such as by interrupting the execution. In this paper we define a novel category of security controllers called lazy controllers, a conservative extension of standard controllers which routinely suspend the observation of the target for different time spans, in order to reduce the cost of monitoring and increase performance, at the expense of the possibility of missing a violation. We show how a proactive truncation controller can be extended to the lazy setting, and we formally characterize the relation between the length of suspended time spans and the actual violation risk, which constitutes the formal ground of our approach. This allows the actual time of suspension to be determined according to a given maximum bearable risk. Precisely, we formally investigate three classes of systems, namely nondeterministic, probabilistic, and stochastic systems.
Introduction
Security controllers are a common practice for guaranteeing that an untrusted application complies with a security specification. In words, the problem of controlling the execution of a system can be stated as follows: "Given a system S and a security policy ϕ, define an effective procedure to control that the execution of S does not violate ϕ".
In the last decades, the research on software security has seen a parallel evolution of static verification methods and security controllers. This is because the main drawbacks of static analysis (such as false positives), can be easily overcome by controllers. Several recent proposals [1] [2] [3] [4] advocate the use of integrated frameworks for verification and monitoring.
An influential approach to the definition of security policies and controllers was originally introduced by Schneider in [5] , where he proposed a category of Finite State Automata (FSA), called security automata, for specifying security policies. A further crucial contribution in the theory of security controllers was given by Bauer et al. [6] , in which they characterized a larger class of policies, namely edit policies, by means of edit automata which enforce them. An edit automaton reads the next action of its target and decides whether to (i) allow it, (ii) suppress it or (iii) anticipate it with another one.
In this paper we define a new class of security controllers, namely lazy controllers which can autonomously decide to suspend the observations for a certain time span. Clearly, differently from the standard proactive controllers, a lazy controller may miss a security violation while it is suspended. Such violations are called passive, against those which are detected, called active.
Controlling the target discontinuously has various advantages. In terms of performance and costs, for example, the monitoring process can be optimised by reducing the number of validity checks on the target behaviour. Another important advantage concerns the applicability. In fact, a continuous and synchronous access to all the target actions can be quite restrictive for certain applications of security controllers. For instance, it is common to use log auditing [7, 8] to check the last actions performed by a system without interacting with its execution.
A crucial aspect of the applicability of lazy controllers is the calculation of the risk deriving from suspending the controller. This allows scheduling the observations in such a way to ensure that no passive security violations occur while suspended, with a given probability of error bounded by a given maximum allowed risk. In general, increasing the risk threshold implies that observations can be scheduled less frequently, thus exploiting the advantages of lazy monitoring. Finding an optimal scheduling, i.e. one which bounds the probability of passive violations to the risk, is the crucial issue when using lazy controllers.
In this paper we define controller synthesis strategies for three kinds of systems: (i) non-deterministic targets with non-instantaneous actions, (ii) probabilistic targets modelled as Discrete Time Markov Chains and (iii) stochastic targets modelled as Continuous Time Markov Chains. In each case we provide an analytical measure of the risk of passive violations. This allows synthesizing optimal controllers, for any given (arbitrarily small) risk factor. Such results demonstrate that lazy controllers can be used to indefinitely approximate the behaviour of traditional controllers by reducing the risk factor. Finally, they can be applied to scenarios in which the monitoring process has a precise cost, by allowing a trade-off between the security risk and the security budget.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we recall some background concepts, and in Section 3 we define lazy controllers. In Sections 4 and 5 we discuss the synthesis of lazy controllers for specific targets. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Background
A Labelled Transition System (LTS) is a triple (S, Λ, →) where Λ is a set of labels, S is a set of states and →⊆ S × Λ × S is a set of labelled transitions. LTSs are often used to describe the behaviour of systems which allow for external observations. Observable actions are fired when the system performs a visible state change. Sometimes it can be useful to model state changes that produce no observable actions. In those cases, the set of labels is extended with the special symbol · ∈ Λ, which is used to label the corresponding transitions. As usual, we write s α − → s in place of (s, α, s ) ∈→.
As regards timed systems, we consider Timed LTSs, namely LTSs with states of the form T × S, where T denotes the underlying time-domain of the system. Time domain T can be either discrete or continuous, and we assume a total order relation ≤ among its elements. A transition t, s α − → t , s describes a state change from s to s , occurring at time t , and exhibiting label α ∈ Λ. Time cannot decrease, that is t ≤ t for each transition. Transitions occur instantaneously, thus for all time instants x such that t ≤ x < t the system is in state s. Besides the action labels in Λ, we assume an external observer to know the actual transition times t, t ∈ T. Timed systems generalize non-timed systems, which can be seen as discrete-time systems with time domain T = N and transitions of the form t, s α − → t + 1, s . We define security controllers both in the case of untimed systems and of timed systems, where the latter case is a trivial extension of the former. Definition 1. Let S be the set of states of a target, C the set of states of a controller, Σ a set of labels, and T a time-domain. An Untimed Security Controller is an LTS (C × S, Σ, =⇒) where =⇒⊆ (C × S) × Σ × (C × S). A Timed Security Controller is a Timed LTS (T × C × S, Σ, =⇒) where
We introduce truncation controllers, a particular kind of controllers that we use in the following sections for the synthesis of lazy controllers, both in the untimed and timed settings. Following the approach of [9] , we define the truncation controllers by using a binary operator driving the execution of a target S under the scope of a controller C, denoted C S. Definition 2. Let (S, Σ, − → sys ) be the LTS describing the target system, and (C, Σ, − → ctr ) be the LTS describing the behaviour allowed by the controller. A truncation controller is the security controller (C × S, Σ, =⇒) where =⇒ is the least transition relation defined by rule (monitor) from Figure 1 .
The truncation controller is extended to the timed setting by using the timed transition system of the target, as defined in the following.
Definition 3. Let (T × S, Σ, − → sys ) be a Timed LTS describing the possible behaviour of a given target system, and (C, Σ, − → ctr ) be the LTS describing the behaviour allowed by the controller. A timed truncation controller is the timed security controller (T × C × S, Σ, =⇒) where =⇒ is the least transition relation defined by rule (T-monitor) from Figure 1 . 
A theory of lazy controllers
In this section we present a theory of lazy controllers, along with their Structural Operational Semantics (SOS) [10, 11] which retains the standard theory of proactive controllers. In the next sections we prove theorems stating this relation. Intuitively, we provide a framework into which standard controllers can be embedded, yielding lazy controllers. We assume a set of visible actions Σ = {a, b, c, . . .} and we build from it the set of unseen actions Σ = { a | a ∈ Σ}. These two sets account for the fact that, depending on the observations scheduled by the controller, any action performed by the target can be either observed or not. We denote the set of the states of a proactive controller by C, the set of the states of a target by S and the timedomain (e.g., discrete or continuous) underlying the target by T. We define a lazy controller as follows. 
is the active monitoring relation; -− → lctr ⊆ C × Σ × C is the update relation for unseen actions; -ζ : C × T → T is the scheduling function;
As we discussed in Section 2, the relation =⇒ characterizes the input timed proactive controller t, C S . Such a relation is generally built by using a relation for the controller describing all the possible allowed behaviors, such as relation − → ctr used for truncation controllers in Definitions 2 and 3. In lazy controllers, we also have an update relation − → lctr , which differs from − → ctr by being defined over unseen actions in Σ. Relation − → lctr captures the operational notion of activity logging: as far as the controller is not observing the system, i.e., it is idle, every action is freely performed by the target and is logged. When the controller wakes up at any scheduled observation point, it examines the log in order to detect any passive violation, and acts according to its strategy, e.g., by truncating or editing the observed behaviour. Finally, it performs the scheduled observation, before looping this process. Therefore, the relation − → lctr is actually a step-by-step operational definition of both the procedure of log checking and the recovery strategies.
Finally, function ζ provides the scheduling of the observations over the execution of the target. Notice that ζ(c, t) = t is a function from a state c of the controller and the time t of the last action performed by the target to a observation time t . In the next sections, when dealing with the synthesis of lazy controller, we show how to automatically create a function ζ starting from a security policy and a suitable description of the target system.
We now define the SOS of a lazy controller. In the following, we denote with α ∈ Σ ∪ {·} all the visible actions plus the special symbol ·, used for transitions not accounting for any action. Let us denote by D = T × C × T × S × T the set of all the configurations, and with A = Σ ∪ Σ ∪ {·} the set of labels. The semantics of a controller is the LTS (D, A, − → lzy ) where − → lzy ⊆ D × A × D is the least transition relation defined by the inference rules of Figure 2 . In those rules we make use of two boxing operators [| |] and {| |} . If the time is t we write [|C|] n , where C ∈ C and n ∈ T, to denote that the controller has scheduled the next observation at time t + n. Differently, we write {|S|} h , where S ∈ S and h ∈ T, to denote that the target performed its last transition at time t − h in the past. In both cases n and t denote relative times, hence from a configuration Rule (Monitor) states that if at time t a proactive controller must not wait further to observe the target, namely ζ(C, ·) = 0, then any action of the target started at previous time t − h and completing at time t − h + x should be proactively monitored. 4 When so, we make use of the relation characterizing such a proactive controller, =⇒. Moreover, notice that by using the boxing operator for the target we are able to derive timed-transitions from the past time t − h, meaning that the passage of time is synchronous for S. We remark that, to have a good scheduling function, the next action should really be a passive violation, correctly prevented by the controller.
Rule (Log) states that if the time is t and the controller has scheduled the next observation at time t + k, then any action which S performs before t + k is not controlled, but simply logged by means of the derivations of − → lctr . In this time-window a passive violation may happen, not being detected up to time t+k. Finally, rule (Wakeup) makes the controller able to spend time autonomously and synchronously with the target S.
The following theorem 5 shows that lazy controllers are a conservative extension of standard proactive controllers. In fact, if a lazy controller never suspends the observations, then we obtain the same process as the proactive controller. Theorem 1. Let (T×C×S, Σ, =⇒) be a timed security controller. Let (C, S, Σ, T, =⇒ , − → lctr , ζ) be a lazy security controller with − → lctr arbitrarily defined and ζ such that ∀C ∈ C, t ∈ T. ζ(C, t) = 0. Then ∀t, t ∈ T, C, C ∈ C, S, S ∈ S, x ∈ Σ * :
Synthesis of Lazy Controllers
In this section we discuss the synthesis of lazy security controllers for nonprobabilistic, probabilistic and stochastic targets. In particular, we take into account (i) non-deterministic Finite State Machines (FSMs) with non-instantaneous transitions, (ii) Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMCs) and, finally, (iii) Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMCs). We consider FSMs because they have been traditionally adopted for system modelling and Markov chains because they are receiving major attention as formal descriptions of timed systems. We represent the targets as FSMs enriched with labels, taken from a countable domain, on the transitions between states. The targets differ only for such labels, i.e. in (i) labels represent durations, in (ii) probabilities and in (iii) the parameters of exponentially-distributed random variables. In this paper, we consider only lazy truncation controllers. They extend proactive truncation controllers in the natural way, i.e., by interrupting a violating execution either proactively or as soon as they wake up, after a violation occurred. We argue that enforcing controllers can be similarly synthesized by adapting standard enforcement strategies in the framework of lazy controllers. An investigation of these aspects is left as future work.
In this section we discuss the synthesis of the controller structure. This is done in the same way for all the three types of FSMs considered since the states and transitions of a lazy controller can be synthesized independently of the interpretation we give to the labels of the target FSM, but rather by considering only its structure. In the next section we conclude the synthesis strategy by defining the scheduling functions, which instead depend on the type of FSM we are considering.
Preliminaries We recall some preliminary notions.
A Finite State Machine (FSM) is a tuple M = (Σ, Q, ι, δ, F ) where: Σ is a finite alphabet of actions, Q is a finite set of states, ι ∈ Q is the initial state, δ ⊆ Q × Σ × Q is the set of (labelled) transitions, F ⊆ Q is the set of final states. Let us denote by Σ n , with n ∈ N all words over the alphabet Σ having length n, and let Σ * = n∈N Σ n denote all the finite words over Σ. Moreover, we denote by Σ ω all the infinite words (ω-words) over Σ, and let
k can be associated with such a sequence π. The set of all finite paths from a state q to a state q is denoted P aths(q, q ). An infinite path π is a sequence of states q 0 , q 1 , . . . , q k , . . .
Similarly to the finite case, we can associate an infinite word W(π ) ∈ Σ ω to such a path. The set of all infinite paths from a state q is denoted P aths ω (q). When a FSM is interpreted as an automaton on finite words its semantics is a language L ⊆ Σ * . Given a FSM A, we denote its language on finite words as L(A), where x ∈ L(A) iff there is path from the initial state ι to any final state. Formally, L(A) = {W(π) | q ∈ F, π ∈ P aths(ι, q)}.
A FSM A is called deterministic iff, for each state, there is exactly one transition for each possible symbol. Formally, ∀q ∈ Q, σ ∈ Σ. ∃!q ∈ Q. (q, σ, q ) ∈ δ. We denote by det(A) a deterministic FSM equivalent to A, i.e., such that L(det(A)) = L(A). Given two FSMs A and D = det(A), there always exists a mapping function µ : Q A → P(Q D ) which relates each state of A with a set of states from D. Note that det(A) univocally denotes one of the possible deterministic FSM which are equivalent to A. We assume that, if A is deterministic, then det(A) = A.
We also consider the standard definition of the parallel composition of FSMs. Let A = (Σ, Q A , ι A , δ A , F A ) and B = (Σ, Q B , ι B , δ B , F B ) be two FSMs, using the same alphabet Σ. The parallel composition of A and B is defined as
We assume a computation of a non-terminating system to be represented as an infinite ω-word over a given alphabet Σ. A FSM can be interpreted as an automaton over ω-words, by using a proper acceptance condition. In this paper, as regards automata over ω-words, we only consider FSMs for which any possible transition is always accepted. Therefore, in this case, the set of final states F is not involved in the definition of the acceptance condition.
In order to formally define safety properties, we need some preliminary definitions. We first consider bad prefixes for a given language of infinite words L ⊆ Σ ω , which intuitively identify any finite word which cannot be extended to an infinite word of the language. A language of infinite words L ⊆ Σ ω such that each word not in L has a bad prefix is called safety language. Formmally, a finite word x ∈ Σ * is a bad prefix for a language L ⊆ Σ ω iff ∀y ∈ Σ ω . xy / ∈ L. Let BadPrefixes(L) denote the set of all bad prefixes for a given language L.
Let us denote by A bad(L) a (non-deterministic) FSM recognizing the bad prefixes of a given safety language L, that is L(A bad(L) ) = BadPrefixes(L). Note that the language BadPrefixes(L), for a given safety language L, is closed under concatenation with arbitrary symbols, i.e. ∀x ∈ Σ * , σ ∈ Σ. x ∈ BadPrefixes(L) =⇒ xσ ∈ BadPrefixes(L). Therefore we can assume that A bad(L) has exactly one final state ψ such that for each symbol σ there is a transition ψ σ − → ψ, and there is no other transition exiting from ψ.
Let us consider a safety property ϕ, namely a property whose set L(ϕ) of infinite words satisfying it form a safety language. Intuitively, a safety property is such that every violation occurs after a finite execution of the system. We denote by A bad(ϕ) = A bad(L(ϕ)) a (non-deterministic) FSM which recognizes the bad prefixes of the (language described by the) safety property ϕ, that is the all and only words which do not satisfy the property.
A safety property can be expressed using various formalisms, such as LTL formulae [12] or Büchi automata [13] . We do not discuss the aspect of the translation of a safety property ϕ into a FSM A bad(ϕ) which recognizes its bad prefixes. Instead, in the following, we assume such a FSM to be given. We refer the reader to [14] for details on the construction of FSMs recognizing bad prefixes of LTL formulae and Büchi automata.
Synthesis of the controller structure
We consider a non-deterministic FSM A = (Σ, Q A , q A 0 , δ A , F A ) capturing all the possible behaviour for the target. In synthesizing the controller structure we abstract away from the type of labels which appear on the transitions of the enriched version of A. According to Definition 5 A is to be interpreted as an automaton over ω-words, moreover we assume F A = Q A since the set of final states is not involved in the semantics of such a FSM.
Let ϕ be a safety property, in the proactive setting, a truncation controller can be defined from the deterministic FSM det(A bad(ϕ) ), in which a transition is allowed only if it does not end up in the final state. By exploiting Definitions 2 and 3, we can obtain a proactive controller =⇒ with such a behaviour by using a transition relation − → ctr defined by the following inference rule.
(good)
According to the semantics of · · from Definitions 2 and 3, such a definition of − → ctr is applicable to both untimed and timed systems. Slightly abusing notation, we denote the ensemble of the controller and the target as A bad(ϕ) A.
Recall from Section 3 that a lazy controller is completely specified by (i) an active monitoring relation =⇒, (ii) an update relation for unseen actions − → lctr , and (iii) a scheduling function ζ. As regards the kinds of target that we consider, the corresponding lazy truncation controllers all share the same structure, and just the definition of the scheduling function ζ is different from one to another. Example 1. Throughout this section we consider, as a running example, a target whose behaviour is described by the FSM shown in Figure 3 , with alphabet Σ = {a, b, c}. We construct a controller for preventing the target to perform two consecutive b actions. Such a safety property can be formally expressed as the LTL formula ϕ = G¬(b ∧ Xb). Figure 4 shows the deterministic FSM recognizing the bad prefixes of ϕ, namely det(A bad(ϕ) ).
We detail our construction only in the case of the untimed truncation controller, i.e., Definition 2. The construction in the timed case is analogous, and all the theorems can be easily restated in the timed case by assuming a timed truncation controller as in Definition 3.
The lazy controller is constructed from the parallel composition of det(A bad(ϕ) ) with a deterministic FSM equivalent to A, i.e., it is the FSM C 0 = det(A bad(ϕ) ) det(A). This allows the controller for tracking the actions performed by the target, which is necessary to determine an appropriate scheduling function ζ. In this case, the ensemble of the controller and the target becomes (det(A bad(ϕ) ) det(A)) A, which is equivalent to det(A bad(ϕ) ) A according to the semantics of truncation controllers. This is formally proved by the following theorem. Theorem 2. Let B A be a truncation controller, with A being a non-deterministic FSM describing the behaviour of a target, and B a deterministic FSM describing the truncation controller. Let D = det(A), and
The actual FSM describing the controller is obtained from C 0 by joining together all the final states in a unique final state ψ C0 with a self loop for each symbol in Σ. We call a FSM of this kind absorbing, and we denote it as C = absorbing(C 0 ) where the function absorbing is defined as follows.
where µ : Q C → Q E is a mapping between the states of C and E such that ∀c ∈ Q C \ F C . µ(c) = c and ∀c ∈ F C . µ(c) = ψ E .
For the purposes of runtime monitoring, such a FSM C must be equivalent to C 0 , in spite of the fact that the languages they recognize can be different. Such an equivalence is formally proved by the following theorem. Theorem 3. Let C A be a truncation controller, with A being the non-deterministic FSM of a target, and C a deterministic FSM such that ∀c ∈ F C . δ C (c, σ) ∈ F C . Let E = absorbing(C). Then, ∀x ∈ Σ * , ∀c ∈ Q C , e ∈ Q E , a ∈ Q A :
Example 2. Figure 5 shows the FSM C 0 = det(A bad(ϕ) ) det(A) obtained from the parallel composition of the FSM of the target, in Figure 3 , and the FSM recognizing bad prefixes for ϕ, in Figure 4 . The FSM C = absorbing(C 0 ), obtained from C 0 by collapsing all the final states in one, and for which there is a self loop for each possible symbol in the alphabet, is shown in Figure 6 . Notice that C 0 has three final states F C0 = {S 0 T 2 , S 1 T 2 , S 2 T 2 }, which are replaced in C by the only final state S 1 T 2 .
The active monitoring relation =⇒ and the update relation for unseen actions − → lctr are both constructed from the target FSM A and the LTL safety property ϕ, since their definition does not depend on the type of FSM we consider. In particular, the active monitoring relation =⇒ corresponds to the timed truncation controller from Definition 3. The update relation for unseen actions − → lctr , i.e., how the state of the controller is updated when an unseen action occurs, is defined as follows.
Definition 7. The update relation for unseen actions − → lctr for a lazy truncation controller is the least relation defined by the following rules:
Rule (asleep) mirrors δ C as far as non-final state are involved. As soon as the controller reaches a final state in F C , rule (nil) ensures that it remains in such a state while accepting any unseen actions, according to the fact that a sleeping controller does not block unseen actions.
Synthesis of the scheduling functions
Here we complete the synthesis of lazy controllers by defining scheduling functions for the targets considered in the previous section. We split the presentation according to the type of target considered.
Scheduling Functions for Non-Probabilistic Systems
We recall that we are considering a non-deterministic target A = (Σ, Q A , ι A , δ A , F A ), where F A = Q A , hereby enriched with a function θ : Q A × Σ × Q A → R + denoting the durations associated with transitions. We assume θ(t) = 0 for all t / ∈ δ A . The semantics of a target (A, θ) is the Timed LTS (R + × Q A , Σ, − → sys ) where − → sys is the least transition relation defined by the following axiom:
This relation is also valid for targets with discrete underlying time domain.
Recall that the controller is defined by the FSM C = absorbing(B D), where B = det(A bad(ϕ) ) and D = det(A). Given a state c ∈ Q C of the controller, we define a function giving the shortest duration of any path from the current state c to the final state of C, denoted ψ C . Let µ C : Q B D → Q C denote the mapping defining the absorbing function, and let µ D : Q A → P(Q D ) denote the mapping from the states of the FSM A to the states of the FSM det(A). Let ν(c) denote the set of states of A which are mapped to a state c ∈ Q C , i.e. ν(c) = {a | ∃b,
is also extented to paths as ν(c 1 , . . . , c k ) = {a 1 , . . . , a k | ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k. a i ∈ ν(c i )}. A function duration can be formally defined as follows:
Note that ζ(c, h) takes into account the fact that the last action from the target has been seen at time t − h. For this type of targets we can prove that no passive violation can happen if the scheduling function satisfies Equation 2. 
Scheduling Functions for Discrete Time Markov Chains
As a first probabilistic system we consider a target described by a homogenous Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC), i.e., a target moving probabilistically over a finite set of states, where at any time the probability of jumping to a state is completely determined in the state itself.
Definition 8. A Discrete Time Markov Chain is a tuple (S, s, P) where (i) S is a finite set of states; (ii) s is the initial state; (iii) P : S × S → [0, 1] is a transition probability matrix, such that s ∈S P(s, s ) = 1 for all states s ∈ S.
Each element P(s, s ) gives the probability of a transition from s to s , i.e., P(s, s ) = P(X(k + 1) = s | X(k) = s) for any k ≥ 0. A DTMC is a family of random variables {X(k) | k = 0, 1, 2, . . .} where X(k), ranging over states, are observations made at discrete time-steps. Among others, these probabilistic processes satisfy the Markov property: the state at time k depends only on the state at time k − 1, and not on the states at previous times, i.e., the history.
We enrich this definition of DTMC with labels denoting actions on the transitions. We consider a target as the pair (A, θ), where
giving the probability associated with each transition. Recall that the probabilities of all the transitions exiting from a state must sum up to 1. We also assume θ(t) = 0 for all t / ∈ δ A . According to Definition 8 a labeled DTMC representing (A, θ) is a tuple (Q A , e (ι A ) , P), where e (ι A ) is a unit vector with only a 1 in the position corresponding to the initial state ι A , and the matrix of transition prob-
Our strategy for synthesizing the controller structure yields a FSM structurally analogous to some DTMCs having reachability properties, which we now discuss. Some terminology has to be introduced first: a DTMC state is transient (conversely recurrent) if any execution visits it only finitely many times. Differently, a state s is absorbing if it cannot be left, i.e., P(s, s) = 1. A terminating DTMC is a Markov chain where all states are transient, except one which is absorbing. Intuitively, the controller we synthesize is structurally equivalent to a terminating DTMC. For these types of DTMCs the time to absorption T s , i.e., the time it takes to enter the absorbing state, assuming the DTMC starts in state s, follows a well-known Discrete Phase-type distribution [15] . Definition 9. Let (S, s, P) be a terminating DTMC, through a proper reordering of its states, we can always write P as P = restricts P to the transient states, (ii) ρ is a column vector which contains probabilities from each transient state to the absorbing one, and (iii) 0 is a zero row vector.
A Discrete Phase-type (DPH) distribution, denoted DP H(τ ,P), is a row vector τ ∈ {0, 1} |S|−1 specifying the initial probability distribution over transient states, and the matrixP. Its cumulative distribution function, i.e., the probability that the time ∆t to the absorbing state is smaller or equal to x, reads as Given the system in a non-absorbing state s at time t, this distribution characterizes the probability of jumping to the absorbing state, in any number of steps, within time t > t.
We now show why this distribution allows for analytically determining the probability that the lazy controller misses the detection of a violation. Given a DTMC (A, θ), its set of possible timed transitions is described by the transition relation − → sys , defined in Figure 7 , i.e., a special case of the non-probabilistic system where steps last 1 time-unit. As we said, the controller is the FSM C = absorbing(det(A bad(ϕ) ) A), since A is deterministic, and is equipped with a labelling function θ :
, built from θ, to obtain a labelled DTMC (C, θ). Let µ C denote the mapping defining the absorbing function. Then, the labelling function θ, giving the transition probabilities, is such that σ, a 2 ) where, for i = 1, 2, a i is such that µ C (c i ) = (b i , a i ) for some b i . Moreover, ∀σ ∈ Σ. θ(ψ C , σ, ψ C ) = 1/|Σ|. Note that the probabilities associated with the loop transition on the final state are not important, as long as they sum up to 1, for correctness.
Recall that C has a unique absorbing state ψ C in which the bad prefix of the target trace is recognized, i.e. the violation is detected. This proposition holds. Hence the probability of passive violations can be bounded by using such a distribution: given a state c ∈ Q C , the function ζ(c, h) gives the maximum allowed time ∆t ∈ N for which the probability of reaching the final state ψ C from the current state c, within ∆t time units, is less than a probability β. Formally, if the current state of the DTMC is c then the cumulative distribution function F of DP H(e (c) ,P) gives the time for scheduling for the next observation by solving
where β ∈ [0, 1] is a given probability of error. Notice that this corresponds to using the random variable Y = (X − h) where X ∼ DP H(τ ,P) and Y is the linear transformation of X and h. We remark that even though the exponential jumps of a DTMC are memoryless (i.e., the time past h could be disregarded if we considered exponential waiting times individually), the DPH and hence Y are not, requiring us to use h in equation (4) . Moreover, the outmost max operation is required since X has infinite support, i.e., the probability that x ∈ [0, h] = 0. The following proposition states an important property for lazy controllers synthesized in this manner.
Proposition 2.
If ζ(c, h) = ∆t with ∆t a solution of equation (4) for some β ∈ [0, 1], then the probability of a passive violation is bounded by β. 
The latter of these matrices is obtained from the former through the definition of parallel composition of FSMs. From P , by considering the top-left 4 × 4 sub-matrix, we extractP . If we numerically solve equation (4) by varying the state-distribution τ to account for each possible state of the chain we obtain the following values for the scheduling function ζ(
for the threshold β = 0.2. Thus, for instance, from S 0 T 0 with probability higher than 80% no passive violations will happen in the next 4 steps. If one lowers the threshold to β = 0.05 the observations need to be scheduled more frequently, e.g., in that case ζ(S 0 T 0 , 0) = 2.
Scheduling Functions for Continuous Time Markov Chains
A homogenous Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) is a probabilistic model of a target with an underlying continuous time domain, i.e., an analogous of a DTMC where a real valued clock underlies the system.
Definition 10. A Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) is a tuple (S, s, R)
where S is a finite set of states, s ∈ S is the initial state, R : S × S → R ≥0 is the transition rate matrix.
The transition rate between each pair of states is described in the transition rate matrix R, and represents the negative parameter of an exponential distribution. The time spent in a state s ∈ S is exponentially distributed with rate E(s),
The value E(s), for a state s, is called the exit rate of s. From a CTMC an embedded DTMC can be retrieved by defining its transition probability matrix P(s, s ) = R(s, s )/E(s). Targets whose behaviour is described as a CTMC generate executions where the sojourn time in a state is distributed according to an exponential distribution with parameter corresponding to the exit rate of the state, and in which the probabilistic jumps are resolved according to the embedded DTMC. The notions we introduced for DTMCs apply also to CTMCs where an absorbing state s is such that E(s) = 0. Also, labelled extensions of CTMCs can be obtained along the line of the labelled extensions of DTMCs.
Scheduling functions for CTMCs are defined similarly to the corresponding discrete case. In particular, the time until absorption is described by Continuous Phase-type (PH) distribution, as opposed to the DPH distribution of the previous case. Technically, given a set of states Q A = {q 1 , . . . , q n }, a labelled CTMC is described as a pair (A, θ), where A = (Σ, Q A , ι A , δ A , F A ), with F A = Q A , is a deterministic FSM, and θ : Q A × Σ × Q A → R + gives the rate associated with each transition. As in the previous cases, we assume θ(t) = 0 for all t / ∈ δ A . According to Definition 10, a labelled CTMC can be represented as a tuple (Q A , e (ι A ) , R), where e (ι A ) is a unit vector with only a 1 in the position corresponding to the initial state ι A , and R = [r ij ], namely the transition rates matrix, is such that r ij = σ∈Σ θ(q i , σ, q j ). A Continuous Phase-type (PH) distribution P H(τ ,R in ) is a row vector τ ∈ {0, 1} |S|−1 , i.e., the initial distribution over transient states and the matrixR in .
Its cumulative distribution function is F (x) = 1 − τ eR x 1 for x ∈ R + where e (·) denotes matrix exponentiation.
The set of possible timed transitions of a given CTMC (A, θ) is described by the transition relation − → sys , defined in Figure 8 . Note that, since the exponential distribution takes values in [0, +∞) such a relation defines infinite transitions.
As in the discrete case the controller is C = absorbing(det(A bad(ϕ) ) A) enriched with a labelling function θ : Q C × Σ × Q C → R + . The definition of θ is analogous to that of the DTMC, provided that the loop transition on the final state is ∀σ ∈ Σ. θ(ψ C , σ, ψ C ) = 0. A continuous-time analogous of Proposition 1 can now be stated.
Proposition 3. The PH distribution of (C, θ) is the distribution of the time until the next violation for such a CTMC.
As in the discrete case such a chain is terminating and the absorbing state is ψ C . Given a state c ∈ Q C , function ζ(c, h) gives the maximum allowed time ∆t ∈ R for which the probability of reaching the final state ψ C from the current state c, within ∆t time units, is less than a arbitrary probability β, as it was for DTMCs. The first time to reach the absorbing state follows a Continuous Phase-type distribution P H(e (c) ,R in ) obtained from the CTMC (C, θ) according to Definition 11. Given its cumulative distribution function F the maximum time to sleep is again given by ∆t = max{0, max{t|F (t) ≤ β}−h}, which corresponds, when ∆t > h, to solving 1 − τ eR in (∆t+h) 1 = β
since F is monotonic. As for DTMCs, h appears since the PH is not memoryless. 
Conclusions
In this work we have proposed a novel class of security controllers, namely lazy controllers, and we have formally investigated the applicability of the framework to proactive truncation controllers. The novelty of our technique stands in the possibility of scheduling the security checks along the execution trace of the target, thus avoiding a costly continuous check of each action performed. Although this generates a risk factor of missing violating actions, it also extends the applicability of security monitors to many real-world scenarios, such as remotely logged systems. Moreover, we have formally analysed the risk of a security violation for the cases of non-deterministic, probabilistic and stochastic systems. This constitutes the formal ground of our approach, which allows us to guarantee that a lazy controller never exceeds the maximum violation risk.
In this paper we have presented only the theoretical aspects of lazy controllers definition and synthesis. A prototype implementation for remotely watching the execution of OSGi bundles, showing the practical feasibility of our approach, has been presented and analysed in [16] . We leave as future work the extension to the lazy setting of other kinds of controllers, such as those based on edit automata.
